One of the sources of randomness for a random bit generator (RBG) is jitter present in rectangular signals produced by ring oscillators (ROs). This paper presents a novel approach for the design of delays used in these oscillators. We suggest using delay elements made on carry4 primitives instead of series of inverters or latches considered in the literature. It enables the construction of many high frequency ring oscillators with different nominal frequencies in the same field programmable gate array (FPGA). To assess the unpredictability of bits produced by RO-based RBG, the restarts mechanism, proposed in earlier papers, was used. The output sequences pass all NIST 800-22 statistical tests for smaller number of ring oscillators than the constructions described in the literature. Due to the number of ROs with different nominal frequencies and the method of construction of carry4 primitives, it is expected that the proposed RBG is more robust to cryptographic attacks than RBGs using inverters or latches as delay element.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE of promising techniques for producing random bit sequences that pass all statistical tests is combining XOR bit streams produced by independent generators with weak statistical properties. The generators, called the source generators, can use different sources of randomness. It can be noise generated by a physical system [1] - [5] , metastable states [6] - [10] , the chaos phenomenon [11] - [19] or jitter produced by ring oscillators [20] - [29] . Mixed solutions that combine various properties of these basic techniques also exist. From a cryptography perspective, analog solutions have several drawbacks. They are: the access to random bits which have to be sent to a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementing a cryptographic system, continuous work which can reveal weaknesses of the entropy source, the sensitivity to power attack which degenerate the quality of random source or a small output bit rates (below 1 Mbit/s). Such sources require also developed methods for continuous monitoring to detect imperfections of entropy source caused by internal or external conditions. An alternative seems to be random bit generators (RBGs) which use jitter observed in ring oscillators. Such generators can be easily integrated with cryptographic systems in the same FPGA. The RBGs can produce random bits "on demand" which are not visible outside FPGA. Such generator M. Jessa is with Poznań University of Technology, Faculty of Electronics and Telecommunications, Polanka 3, 60-965 Poznań, Poland (e-mail: mjessa@et.put.poznan.pl).
L. Matuszewski is with Poznań University of Technology, Faculty of Electronics and Telecommunications, Polanka 3, 60-965 Poznań, Poland (email: lukasz.matuszewski@et.put.poznan.pl). was proposed by Sunar at. al. in 2007 [30] and next modified by Wold and Tan in 2008 [31] . The output bit rate reported by Wold and Petrović achieved 300 Mbit/s, and the output streams passed statistical tests for 25 source generators [32] . A year later, N. Bochard et al. showed experimentally that such a generator can produce bit streams that pass statistical tests when no random component is present in the ring generators [33] , which indicates that this generator should not be a source of randomness. To distinguish between randomness and pseudo-randomness, M. Jessa and M. Jaworski proposed in 2010 to use the chi-square test and the restart mechanism [34] . Through experiments with real circuits, it was proved that a very small amount of randomness, present in a singlering oscillator, accumulates as the function of the number of bits combined XOR at the same time instant [34] , [35] . The generator of Wold and Tan can provide a bit sequence suitable for cryptographic applications, when we choose every j-th bit from the original sequence, where j is greater than a certain minimum value m min [34] , [35] . It significantly reduces the throughput, e.g., from 300 Mbit/s, declared in [32] , to approximately 7.14 Mbit/s for 50 source generators [34] . This value depends on the location of the project in the field-programmable gate array and may vary for different types of FPGAs. It was also observed that the frequencies of neighbor ROs may depend on each other when they are implemented in the same FPGA [36] . Therefore, the designers try to place the source generators in the FPGA "suitably" to avoid interactions. This approach usually gives satisfactory results but is impractical for industry. Ring-oscillator-based RBG can also be attacked with the use of frequency injection attack [37] . During this attack, a certain number of ROs lock to frequencies injected into the power supply, eliminating the independence of the generators and significantly reducing the randomness of the output bit stream. A method for eliminating this weakness of the RO-based combined RBG was proposed in 2012 in conference paper [38] . In this paper, we describe wider this method and propose its modification. The goal of the modification is to increase the randomness of a single random source and, consequently, the reduction the value of m min . As previously, the key point of the method is to ensure different nominal frequencies of ROs which prevents coupling between neighbor ROs and locking the frequencies of many ROs to the "injected" frequency. The output bit streams pass the NIST 800-22 tests without any additional post-processing, necessary for analog RBGs.
In Section II, the structure of the combined RBG and a brief theory of RO-based RBG are introduced. The construction of the delay element, used in all ROs, is described in the same section. Section III presents a method and the results of assessing the amount of true randomness present in output signals of the combined RBG using a series of primitives, called carry4. A method for enhancing the randomness of the combined RBG using carry4 is described in Section IV. The results of statistical tests are presented in Section V. The paper ends with the conclusions.
II. COMBINING XOR INDEPENDENT RANDOM BITS PRODUCED BY MANY RO-BASED RBGS

A. Jitter Produced by Ring Oscillators as a Source of Randomness
A simple method of producing random bits is sampling the rectangular wave produced by a ring oscillator (Fig. 1) . The frequency f H of the RO is usually several times greater than the frequency f L of the quartz oscillator. To achieve almost perfectly random bits in the circuit from Fig. 1 it is necessary to sample the ring oscillator at a very low frequency [29] . A Dtype flip-flop is triggered by a quartz oscillator that establishes the output bit rate. Ring oscillator shown in Fig. 1 consists of inverter and delay τ connected into a ring. A delay element τ can be realized with an even number of inverters, a chain of latches or a delay line built in many FPGAs.
Ring oscillator from Fig. 1 can be simply implemented in reconfigurable logic as FPGA and CPLD. Thanks for its simplicity, ROs have become the main block in many digital systems, e.g., in voltage-controlled oscillators, serial data transmitters, temperature and voltage sensors on a chip etc. This simple structure and the underlying physical phenomena observed in the RBG from Fig. 1 have been widely studied [20] - [29] , [39] , [40] . Due to relatively large amount of jitter, present in generated signal, ROs are increasingly used as a source of randomness in hardware true random number generators [20] - [29] , [39] . Frequency of signal generated by a single ring oscillator is equal to
where d k is a delay of the k-th component of RO. The expression is true if all components are ideal and delays related with interconnections are ignored. In real circuit this factor is very important and cannot be ignored [36] . Moreover, propagation delays in all circuit paths and gates vary in time, because of shot noise, thermal noise and supply voltage instability [27] , [39] . Having regards to this phenomenon the equation (1) must be submitted as
where d k denotes constant delay of the k-th delay element, di k is the delay of the k-th interconnections in ring oscillator, ∆dt k is the variation of the delay in the k-th component and interconnection caused by variation of temperature, ∆dv k represents the variation of the delay in the k-th component and interconnection caused by supply voltage instability and ∆dr k define others random delays in the k-th element and path in the ring oscillator, e.g., transition spacing or crosstalk's. The frequency of the ring oscillator can vary in time thanks to changes of ∆dt, ∆dv and ∆dr. This variations are called jitter. Because as central limit theorem states that many independent random variables have normal distribution, jitter in RO's follows with Gaussian distribution. Components which vary in time can be written as [27] 
where ∆dt n , ∆dv n , ∆dr n are nondeterministic components and ∆dt d , ∆dv d , ∆dr d are deterministic components, the value of p is a proportion factor. The nondeterministic elements stands on nondeterministic jitter, which is an ideal source of entropy, through which is possible to produces random bits in sampling process. Both nondeterministic and deterministic jitter increases as a function of delay length and with measurement interval. This jitter accumulation is a consequence of the earlier disturbances [40] . Using equation (2) , the instantaneous frequency of ring oscillator with jitter accumulation is
where
is an accumulated jitter during previous half period of signal with frequency of f H and k delay elements [27] . It can be divided into deterministic factor and nondeterministic
where ∆J an = k ∆t nk + ∆dv nk + ∆dr nk (7) denotes an accumulated nondeterministic jitter and
represents an accumulated deterministic jitter with proportion factor of p. As was mentioned in [40] standard deviation of nondeterministic jitter accumulated in ROs is proportional to square root of time. Deterministic jitter has standard deviation proportional to time. It follows that the deterministic jitter accumulates faster than nondeterministic one. 
B. Combined RO-Based RBG
The scheme of combining XOR of K with K > 1 bit streams produced by RO-based RBGs is shown in Fig. 2 [35] . The K element set of source generators is divided into groups. The number of elements in each group does not exceed the number n of inputs of a single lookup table (LUT). First, we combine XOR bits produced by source generators belonging to the same group. The output bits are next sampled by the same clock to form a new set of source streams. The new source streams are divided into new groups. The streams inside the same group are combined XOR, and the bits obtained are sampled by the same clock, producing the next source stream, etc. The process ends when one bit is produced. Figure 2 illustrates this process for no more than 6 3 = 216 source generators (n = 6).
The combined RBG produces the first bit with a delay equal to three periods of the quartz oscillator. To assess the quality of the generated sequence, the bits are sent to a personal computer (PC) via a buffer and a USB 2.0 interface. No post-processing is performed in the PC. We assume that the source generators have frequencies f H,l , l = 1, 2, . . . , K, which are not lower than f L , where f L is the frequency of the quartz oscillator. The placement of all elements depends on the software provided by the manufacturer of the FPGA. We do not perform any manual corrections for the localizations proposed by this software.
The combined RBG proposed by Wold and Tan, studied by many authors, uses ROs with the same number of inverters as the delay τ . Its modification, discussed in [35] and [38] ex- 1  667  2  4  645  2  503  3  6  303  3  299  4  8  260  4  210  5  10  164  5  207  6  12  168  6  157  7  14  164  7  130  8  16  132  8  113  9  18  129  9  115  10  20  123  10  96  11  22  113  11  82  12  24  111  12  76  13  26  106  13  72  14  28  107  14  67  15  30  81  15  63  16  32  68  16  62  17  34  51  17  57  18  36  59  18  50  19  38  55  19  49  20  40  49  20  43  21  42  32  21  37  22  44  41  22  32  23  46  23  23  26  24  48  26  24  42  25 50 23 25 12 ploits as τ latches but it still assumes that the number of latches is the same for the all source generators. The differences in nominal frequencies of ROs result only from technological differences and the length of the connections between elements of each RO. Consequently, the frequencies of the rectangular waves generated by ROs may be very similar. They can also be clustered in groups, especially for a small number of inverters [31] , [36] . Due to the non-ideal separation between ROs, the oscillators can synchronize each other using the phenomenon of injection synchronization discovered for the van der Pol oscillator [41] . Similar frequencies are also responsible for the success of injection attack, as described in [37] . To overcome this disadvantage, the ROs should have significantly different frequencies, and the manipulation of τ should be hard. It requires to use ring oscillators with at least different τ in a combined RBG. For example, the first RO can use two inverters or one latch, the second RO can have four inventers or two latches as τ , and so on. Table I contains the frequencies of K = 25 ROs implemented in Virtex-5 (XC5VLX50T) manufactured by Xilinx [42] . The values from this table are illustrated in Fig. 3 . We have chosen K = 25 because this number of ROs was reported in the literature as sufficient to pass the statistical tests for f L = 100 MHz. All the frequencies were measured with a frequency counter. A greater τ does not always imply a smaller frequency of the RO due to delays introduced by internal connections between slices available in Virtex-5. The length of these connections depends on the placement of elements. In our case, it was determined by the software (ISE Design Suite) provided by Xilinx -the manufacturer of the FPGA. We did not perform any manual corrections for the localizations proposed by this software. inverter latch Fig. 3 . The frequencies of ROs as a function of K for τ implemented as different numbers of inverters and latches [38] . Table I indicates that the use of inverters or latches as τ is inefficient because the condition f H > f L satisfies only 14 ROs with inverters and 9 with latches when f L = 100 MHz. For f L = 200 MHz, we have 4 ROs with inverters and 5 ROs with latches. The above values for K are insufficient to pass the statistical tests by the combined RBG using ROs with significantly different frequencies. We need a different source of delay with a higher granulation.
C. The Use of Carry4 as Delay τ
A series of primitives, called carry4, is available in Xilinx FPGAs [42] . It can be used as a tapped delay line with a slight delay between adjacent taps. The carry4 located in Virtex-5 slices is shown in Fig. 4 . It is located in each slice of Virtex-5 FPGA. Carry4 consists of a series of four MUXes and XORs that connect to the other logic [42] . Fast carry chain logic was designed to make arithmetical functions such as adders, subtractors, and comparators faster and easier to implement. As shown in [43] , carry4 is also applicable fast carry logic as delay τ in ring oscillators, configured as follows: the output of the inverter from Fig. 2 comes to carry4 input CI, and the delayed signal comes to one of the outputs CO(3. . . 0) ( Fig. 4 ) and to the inverter input from Fig. 1 . One carry4 primitive gives four delay taps. If more delay units were required, primitives were connected in series. For ring oscillator number l, l = 1, 2, . . . , K delay was l delay units. For example, for RO number six, the sixth tap was used. Each RO had a delay line with a different delay length, and thus each RO had significantly different nominal frequency. The reason for using carry chain logic as the τ delay element is the ease of implementation and small delay per one tap, which allows the design of many high frequency ring oscillators.
The main disadvantage of this type of solution is the high area occupancy in FPGA. Nevertheless, the carry4 primitive is an excellent part of FPGA to use as a delay line in RO-based RBGs.
The frequencies of ROs for increasing values of τ are shown in Table II Consequently, the throughput can be greater than that for RBGs using ROs with different numbers of inverters or latches. The precise value depends on the results of statistical tests and the randomness of the RBG measured by the restarts mechanism.
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III. ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF RANDOMNESS AND PSEUDO-RANDOMNESS
The source of randomness for ring-oscillator-based RBGs is the accumulated jitter present in the signals of ROs. The jitter contains both noise and a deterministic component. Both components influence the statistical properties of the output sequence, but only the noise component is a source of true randomness. The deterministic component is a source of pseudo-randomness. Therefore, to decide if a source of random bits is suitable for cryptography, we must assess the amount of true randomness and pseudo-randomness present in the output streams. Two basic methods were proposed for distinguishing pseudo randomness and true randomness for ring oscillator-based RBGs. In both methods, we repeat experiments many times starting from identical initial conditions. Because pseudo-randomness is deterministic, it shows identical behavior in each repetition of the experiment. True randomness provides different behavior for identical initial conditions. To ensure identical initial conditions, we replaced the inverters shown in Figs. 1 and 2 with NAND gates triggered by an external signal. In the method described in [26] , the authors recorded 1000 restarts of a ring oscillator, Fibonacci ring oscillator (FIRO) and Galois ring oscillator (GARO). For a given oscillator, the curves diverge from each other quickly. The amount of true randomness in the curves obtained was measured by the computation of the standard deviation of the output voltage as a function of time. If this standard deviation was relatively large, then extracting one bit of true randomness by sampling was easy and reliable [26] . The second method does not assess true randomness contained in the output of a single ring oscillator, but it checks the quality of sequences obtained for successive positions of a bit in time sequences produced by restarts [34] , [35] . Therefore, this method is more suitable for assessing the randomness of RBGs containing more than one RO. The method checks, with the chi-square test, the distribution of bits in sequences obtained for successive positions of a bit in time sequences produced by restarts. This approach was first proposed in paper [34] and described in detail in [35] . In the experiments, 20000 bits were produced for one restart. The number of restarts was equal to 2048, i.e., it was the same as in [35] . It yields 20000 sequences with N = 2048 elements each. If, among the 20000 sequences, there are one or two successive sequences that fail the chi-square test, these failures may be produced by a perfect random source [35] . The value of statistic χ 2 is computed as
where N 0 is the number of zeros in an N -bit sequence and N 1 is the number of ones in this sequence. N · P 0 is the expected number of zeros and N · P 1 is the expected number of ones. Because N · P 0 = N · P 1 = N/2 equation (9) becomes [35] 
where ∆ is the difference between the number of zeros and ones. For a significance level of α = 0.01, the critical χ 2 c value is equal to 6.635. If the value of statistic (10) is smaller than 6.635, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that zeros and ones occur in the m-th, N -element sequence with the same probability. A sequence composed of N = 2048 bits passes the chi-square test if and only if ∆ < 116.5696 . . . .Thus, the difference between the number of zeros and ones cannot exceed 116. A 2048-bit sequence does not pass the chi-square test if and only if ∆ ≥ 117. The probability that the number of zeros differs from the number of ones by at least 117 is p = 1 − p ′ , and p ′ is the probability that the number of zeros differs from the number of ones by no more than 116. Because N is even, ∆ can be only even, including ∆ = 0. For a perfect random source, the probability p ′ can be computed from the following formula [35] 
)] = = 0.990289 . . .
(11)
Because p = 1 − p ′ it is also that p = 0.009711 . . . . If 2048-bit sequences are equally probable, they fail the chi-square test statistically every 1/p ≈ 103 sequences. Two successive sequences do not pass the same test every 1/p 2 ≈ 10604 sequences and three successive sequences fail every 1/p 3 ≈ 10 6 sequences. Because 10 6 is significantly greater than 20000, among 20000 chi-square test results, there is at most one such case for a perfectly random source. If the sequences are produced by a nonrandom source, 2048-bit sequences fail the chi-square test for three successive values of m, m = 1, 2, . . . , 20000 many times. A computer program searches the results of 20000 chi-square tests for the greatest m for which the 2048-bit sequences fail the chi-square test for m, m − 1 and m − 2. For j > m and a given significance level of the test, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that zeros and ones occur with the same probability in successive 2048-bit sequences. Because the equal probability of zero and one in a 2048-bit sequence produced for any j > m is impossible for a deterministic system, we assume that the elements of this sequence are produced by a random source. The smallest j is equal to m + 1 and denoted by m min . If we select every j-th bit from the original sequence as the output, where j < m min , we obtain a sequence with initial bits similar to those previously generated by repeating the generation. To avoid this result, we must select every j-th bit with j satisfying j ≥ m min . We emphasize that the repetition of the generation is typical in cryptography because random numbers are produced when they are needed. The continuous generation of random numbers leads to an undesirable waste of power and simplifies attacks against the RBG. Figures 6-8 present the values of m min for the combined RBG with τ implemented as two inverters, one latch and a delay line with different values [38] .
The shapes of the curves in Figs. 6-8 are similar. For all sampling frequencies, the value for m min decreases irregularly with the increase of K. With more source generators, we increase the randomness of the output sequence. For small K, large differences in randomness between combined RBGs with different realizations of τ can be observed for all sampling frequencies. If K is large, a combined RBG with inverters and latches offers similar randomness. The combined RBG using ROs with the delay τ realized with carry chain logic is worse for all f L . Simultaneously, the same generator produces sequences that pass NIST tests for all sampling frequencies and K significantly smaller than that reported in the literature [38] . It basically indicates that a deterministic component of the accumulated jitter is responsible for the very good statistical properties at the output of this type combined RBG. It also confirms the results of N. Bochard et al. that the method of Wold and Tan can provide sequences that pass all statistical tests when ring oscillators do not exhibit any jitter [33] . The result above does not eliminate this generator from cryptographic applications. To obtain a random sequence, we choose every j-th element of the sequence produced by the RBG described, where j ≥ m min . For example, if the combined RBG uses 50 source generators, it is sufficient to choose every 10 th bit to obtain a random sequence for f L = 100 MHz. It reduces the bit rate to 10 Mbit/s, but the ROs do not synchronize each other, and the frequency injection attack is significantly hampered. 
IV. ENHANCING THE RANDOMNESS OF A COMBINED RBG
Although it is expected that RO-based RBG with delay line is significantly more resistant to injection attacks and to the environmental changes compared to solutions described in the literature, its throughput may not be satisfactory in some applications. To increase the value of this parameter, we have to decrease m min . One of the possible methods which can be applied in FPGAs is the change of the source of sampling frequency f L from quartz oscillator to ring oscillator which offers larger jitter. Because such change does not significantly decrease m min , we have assumed that the output of each RO is sampled by another ring oscillator with significantly smaller frequency, assigned to this RO ( Fig. 9 ). We used pairs of ROs from Table II . The output of oscillator 1 is sampled by oscillator 33, the output of oscillator 2 is sampled by oscillator 34, etc. Generally, the output of the l-th oscillator, is sampled by the (l + K) RO. The values of of m min obtained for modified combined RBG (curve RO D RO) and for the combined RBG from Fig. 2 , using delay τ implemented as two inverters, one latch and a delay line with different values, are shown in Figs. 10-12. Comparing RNGs with carrry4, we see that the use of additional ROs decreases m min for almost all K. The greatest gain is observed for the highest sampling frequency and K between 8 and 22. This is particularly promising because the smallest K that ensures at the output sequences that pass all statistical tests is also relatively small [38] . The results of tests obtained for combined RBGs with inverters and latches will not be further considered because of the sensitivity of RBGs to the injection attack. Fig. 10 . The values of m min for RBGs from Fig. 9 and four realizations of the delay τ , f L = 100 MHz. 
V. THE STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF BIT SEQUENCES PRODUCED BY A COMBINED RBG USING ROS WITH DIFFERENT DELAYS
To assess the statistical properties of the binary sequences produced by the combined RBG using the dedicated delay lines and additional ROs as a source of sampling frequencies, we used the statistical tests described in "A statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudo-Random Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications", document 800-22 prepared by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [44] . These tests are often referred to as the NIST 800-22 statistical test suite or, simply, the NIST 800-22 tests. During testing, we applied two approaches proposed by NIST: (1) we examined the proportion R β of sequences that passed a statistical test, and (2) we examined the distribution of P -values computed by the software; that is, we examined the value of P T [44] . We also assumed the standard set of [31] , [32] , [34] , [35] , [38] . Perfect results of statistical tests suggest that the choice of greater frequency f L is better because of the greater throughput. This is only partially true because the throughput is indeed 28 ). In the both cases the throughput obtained for the combined RBG with additional ROs is significantly greater than the throughput observed for the same combined RBG but without additional ROs. The increase of K over 32 is very limited because of the condition f H > f L . We can decrease the sampling frequency f L below 100 MHz but it decreases the output bit rate. If the resources of FPGA are not critical the optimal choice seems to be generator from Fig. 2 with K greater than 80. In this case, we still have that f H > f L = 100 MHz but m min does not exceed 5. It yields the efficient bit rate at the output of the combined RBG not smaller than 20 Mbit/s for Virtex-5.
VI. CONCLUSION
Combining XOR bits produced at the same time by many independent random number generators is an efficient method for producing random sequences that pass every statistical test. This method requires relatively large resources, and excellent statistical properties can be observed for both deterministic and nondeterministic systems. From a cryptography perspective the elements of output sequence should be unpredictable which require the use of a physical source of randomness. Although the FPGAs are deterministic circuits, we can find phenomena, like jitter in ring oscillators, which can be used to produce unpredictable sequences. Such generator was proposed by Sunar et. al. and next modified by Wold and Tan. The use of delay lines as τ in the generator of Wold and Tan has not been considered in the literature. To apply sequences produced by this generator in cryptography, we have to choose only certain bits of the original sequence as output. The throughput is significantly reduced but it is still greater than for the generator of Wold and Tan. It is also expected that RBGs described in this paper are more robust to injection attack than known solutions of RBGs using ROs. The latter is guaranteed by two elements: the realization of τ with carry chain logic which is robust to different cryptographic attacks, e.g., to power attack, and the distribution of frequencies of ROs over a very wide range. The use of delay lines with different delays for different ROs hampers synchronization between ROs implemented in the same FPGA preventing the quality degradation of RObased combined RBGs.
The generators described in this paper can be an interesting alternative for cryptographic systems for which the resources are not critical. They can be used, e.g., as generators of initialization vectors for block ciphers, in authentications schemes, as generators of salts for passwords storage or as generators of seeds for pseudo-random number generators. When a cryptographic system is implemented as ASIC, better performance of the RBG is expected. A designer can control some parameters, e.g., the length of internal connections, which is very difficult for FPGAs. Consequently, he/she can ensure better reproducibility of the RBG parameters, smaller correlation between ring oscillators and better robustness to cryptographic attacks.
The goal of future research can be methods of decreasing m min for a given resources. One of the promising technique seems to be compression of bits produced in a time window sliding along the generated bits. This method requires fast and parallel processing. Another method which can potentially decrease m min is the use of another phenomena observed in digital circuits, e.g., the metastable states.
